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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license 
revocation by the respondent under Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah 
Code Annotated §41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended (hereinafter all refer-
ences to Utah Code Ann. are to the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended). 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
There are two orders of revocation involved in this case. 
Both orders are dated October 28, 1975; the first is for one year 
beginning September 29, 1975, and the second for one year beginning 
October 9, 1975. The orders concern separate incidents, on August 
19, and August 20, 1975. Since the factual situation was similar in 
both incidents, the matters were consolidated for trial. 
The respondent revoked the appellant's driver's license for 
one year for the latter's alleged failure to submit to a sobriety 
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test under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10. Pursuant to the provisions 
of that act, appellant through his attorney sought a trail de novo 
in the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County, filed on the 14 
day of November, 1975. 
The case was heard before the Honorable Maurice Harding on 
November 21, 1975. Judge Harding found that plaintiff's failure to 
take a chemical test as requested and designated by the arresting 
officer was without justification. Consequently, Judge Harding affirmed 
the prior administrative action revoking the driving privileges of 
plaintiff, in an order dated December 31, 1975. Plaintiff obtained 
from Fourth District Judge Allen B. Sorensen a Stay of Revocation pend-
ing the disposition of the case on appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order of 
December 31, 1975, affirming the revocation of plaintiff's driver's 
license by respondent, and seeks an order restoring the plaintiff's 
driving privileges. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 19, 1975, at approximately 8:44 p.m. at or near 
500 East 350 North, American Fork, Utah, officers John D. Durrant and 
Jay S. Storrs of the American Fork Police Department stopped and ar-
rested plaintiff Ronald Carlos Elliott. Plaintiff had a smell of al-
coholic beverage about his person. Prior to the arrest Officer Durrant 
administered field agility tests, which were witnessed in part by Offi-
cer Storrs. 
Plaintiff was advised of his Constitutional rights ( the 
"Miranda11 rights), and also his rights under Utah Code Ann. §41-644.10, 
referred to as the Implied Consent rights. 
After plaintiff was advised of his rights, the officer request-
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plaintiff was again requested to take a breath test and advised that 
he had a right to have his personal physician present to take a test 
in addition to the test administered by the department. A phone was 
made available for the plaintiff to call his personal physician, but 
he did not do so. 
The officers did not procure nor attempt to procure a physi-
cian, registered nurse, practical nurse or duly authorized laboratory 
technician, from the American Fork Hospital or anywhere else, to with 
draw blood for a blood test; they also declined to go to Provo for 
t h e t e s t. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Should the revocation of plaintiff's license be reversed 
as a consequence of the arresting officer's failure to comply with 
the statutory requirements concerning advice of rights under this sec 
tion? 
2. Under Utah's Implied Consent Law, does plaintiff's refus 
al to take a breath test constitute a refusal without reasonable caus 
when plaintiff reasonably believed such test to be inaccurate, and 
plaintiff requested a Blood test? 
3. Is a revocation improper under this section when the 
plaintiff requested a blood test, and at no time refused such test, 
and the State failed to provide such test? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER UPHOLDING THE REVOCATION OF PLAINTIFF'S DRIVER'S 
LICENSE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IN ADVISING 
PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER UTAH'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW. 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, provides for the 
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revocation of a driver's license for refusal, under certain conditions, 
to submit to a sobriety test. The applicable statutory provisions 
are 
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The statutory provision requires that the arresting 
officer advise the person of his rights under this section after 
refusal to submit to a sobriety test. In Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 
197 (1975), a recent Utah case very similar to the one at bar, the 
Utah Supreme Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that this 
procedure had not been complied with. The Officer placed Gassman under 
arrest, and "immediately, and before any request by the officer or 
any alleged refusal to take a chemical test, read the 'implied consent' 
provision of the act and the 'Miranda1 warning to him11 (emphasis in 
original). Neither the officer in Gassman nor the officers in the pre-
sent case read the plaintiff any rights or obligations — either "Miranda11 
or "implied consent"-after the alleged refusal. 
The fact that there was a reading of rights at the time of 
arrest does not cure the defect. "(T)he statute requires reading one's 
rights after the refusal to take the test, which the officer completely 
failed to do. It is no answer to say anyone waived such statutory pro-
vision because at the time of arrest there was such a reading." Gassman, 
supra at 199 (emphasis in original). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S REFUSAL TO TAKE A BREATH TEST WAS WITH REASONABLE 
CAUSE. 
Section 41-6-44.10 (c), supra, provides for a one-year revo-
cation if the person refused to submit to a chemical test without rea-
sonable cause. As this court noted in Peterson v. Dorius, No. 13981 
(Utah Supreme Court, March 19, 1976), "(i)t is clear that the legisla-
ture recognizes that there might be reasonable causes to refuse to sub-
mit to a chemical test and refusal, with reasonable cause, would not 
justify a revocation." 
In the present case, the plaintiff's license was revoked for 
his request to take a blood test, which he reasonably felt to be accu-
rate. 
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The breath test is disapproved in a number of areas, as noted by this 
Court in Gassman, supra. There, the Court indicated that the breath 
test may well be thrown out. as were the "urine" and "saliva" test, 
in this jurisdiction. It was also felt that Dr. Gassman, a dentist--
certainly knowledgeable in basic medicine-- may well have had legitimate 
qualms about the breath test. And if a medical man may have legitimate 
qualms, then so may anyone else aside from any medical knowledge. 
The fact that the qualms of Gassman and the plaintiff in the 
present case were legitimate is borne out by evidence that they both 
requested a blood test. The logical inference from that fact is that 
they wanted the more accurate tes t t 11 or d e r t o exonerate themselves. 
This Court approved of the blood test 1n another recent Utah 
case construing this section. In Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (1975) , 
it was noted that "(t)here are situations, in this area of law enforce-
ment, when blood test would not only be appropriate, but may be neces-
sary, as the only means of securing analysis." 
In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that plaintiff's 
refusal to submit to a breath test, which he felt to be inaccurate, 
was without reasonable cause. Especially is this true in light of 
his request to take a blood test. 
POINT III 
THE REVOCATION ORDER WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO A SOBRIETY TEST. 
HE WAS AT ALL TIMES WILLING TO TAKE A BLOOD TEST. 
Section 41-6-44.10 (c) provides for revocation of a driver's 
license only if the person was granted the right to a chemical test 
a n
 d refused to submit to such a 1: est. I h e t h rust of the statute is 
this: the consequence of a person's refusal to cooperate with a proper 
police investigation--!. <*., iinreasonab le refusal to submit. In a sobriety 
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test when warranted—is revocation of his driver's license for one year. 
In the first place, the plaintiff was not granted the right 
t^o a reliable test. 
The statute allows the arresting officer to choose, within 
reason, which chemical test shall be determined. Plaintiff contends 
that the officer should be required to take into account the legitimate 
preferences of the plaintiff and grant his preferences if not unreason-
able. As will be demonstrated, plaintiff's request was not unreasonable 
The officer is allowed to choose the test to be administered. 
It is clear on the fact of the statute that a choice was envisioned. 
This clearly precludes the State from making only one test available. 
The State cannot, in fairness, foreclose one test and compel the accused 
to submit to an unreliable or biased test, simply by not making the 
more reliable one available. 
The officer's insistence on the breath test was unreasonable 
in light of the circumstances. The only excuse for such insistence 
was that the American Fork Hospital refused to draw blood samples for 
blood-alcohol tests. But the State has failed to show that the only 
way to draw blood in the vicinity is through the American Fork Hospital. 
The statute, U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 (f) provides for four categories of 
persons who are qualified to withdraw blood under the direction of a 
officer for the purpose of this section: 
§41-6-44.10 (f) Only a physician, registered nurse, 
practical nurse or duly authorized laboratory tech-
nician, acting at the request of a police officer 
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining 
the alcoholic or drug content therein.... any physi-
cian, registered nurse, practical nurse, or duly 
authorized laboratory technician, who, at the 
direction of a police officer, draws a sample of 
blood from any person whom the peace officer has 
reason to believe is driving in violation of this 
chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which 
such sample is drawn, shall be immune from any civil 
or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided 
such test is administered according to standard 
medical practice. 
The American Fork Police Department was on notice that the 
American Fork Hospital would not withdraw blood for a blood-alcohol 
test. The officers did not call the hospital when the plaintiff made 
his request. They did not need to. It was a matter of common knowledge 
in the police force that the hospital would not draw blood. Yet the 
Department made no effort to find a substitute. Surely there must have 
been a physician, registered nurse, or practical nurse in the area 
who would draw blood for the Police Department, especially in light 
of the immunity from civil or criminal liability granted to such person 
by the statute itself. The State has failed to show that there was 
no one in the area qualified and willing to perform this function in 
protection of the rights of the plaintiff, or that it would be unreason-
able to require the Department to arrange for such a person. 
It is important to note that the plaintiff was not stalling 
for time, nor was the failure to administer the requisite test in any 
measure the fault of the plaintiff. 
The fact that plaintiff was allowed to call his personal 
physician, in the second incident, on August 20, 1975, but failed to 
do so should in no way be to the detriment of the plaintiff. It should 
be pointed out that a person may have his own physician administer a 
test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the peace 
officer, U. C. A. 41-6-44.10 (g). The statute does not authorize such 
test to be used by the police force in any prosecution. That would 
lead in future cases to requiring a person to furnish evidence against 
himself. 
In the second place, plaintiff did not refuse. 
Under the facts of Gibb v. Dorius, supra, and for the purpose 
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of the statutory section in question, a person can properly refuse 
a blood test if there is not one qualified to withdraw blood at the 
request of the police officer, for the purposes of this section. Yet 
the record shows that plaintiff did not refuse and was at all times 
willing to submit to a sobriety test. The fact that the test was not 
administered was not due to any misconduct on the part of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff in this case is simply not guilty of the type of conduct 
that this statute was designed to discourage. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the Lower Court is clearly erroneous, and plain-
tiff is entitled to reinstatement of his driving privileges. 
Rule 76 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives this Court 
power of reverse, affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from. 
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah. Prior 
decisions in this jurisdiction give some guidelines for decisions in 
the present case, but none are right on point. The controlling statute 
created duties for arresting officers to comply with in cases such 
as this one. In the case at bar the arresting officers failed to ful-
fill the clear dictates of this statute. The record clearly shows that 
plaintiff was willing to submit to a sobriety test, but that the State 
denied him the right to an acceptable test. The statute does not apply 
to this plaintiff because he was not allowed the more reliable blood 
test, and his failure to take a breath test was not without reasonable 
cause. In addition, plaintiff was not properly advised of his rights 
as mandated by the statute. 
The sanctions of that statute cannot therefore be brought to 
bear on the plaintiff. He is entitled to reinstatement of his driving 
privileges. 
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Respect fully submitted, 
GARY D. STOTT 
Attorney for Appellant 
84 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
